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Enforcing New Property Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The Ugandan Constitution and the 1998 Land Act 
Sandra F Joireman 
A convincing case has been made in both academic studies and policy circles for clear 
ly defined private property rights as a means to economic development. Perhaps best 
characterized by the recent work of Hernando De Soto, well-defined private property 
rights are thought to be critical not just for economic growth, but also as tool to allevi 
ate poverty. The argument that the poor have capital that need only be put to efficient use 
through the creation of institutional structures that will allow them to access it is com 
pelling. De Soto's work follows decades of policy advice provided by the international 
financial institutions-the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund-to devel 
oping countries regarding the privatization of property, both in agriculture and industry. 
The ideological agenda behind their eform advice has been neoliberalism. Reforms are 
designed to facilitate trade and integration into the world market. The focal point of De 
Soto's work, in contrast, is poverty alleviation. Both perspectives suggest policy empha 
sizing well-defined private property rights that can be both exchanged and enforced. 
Countries convinced by this theory have enacted legal reforms to provide an insti 
tutional framework that will enable economic growth. These legal changes have 
occurred at multiple levels. Some countries, such as South Africa, have opted for a legal 
redefinition of property in their basic law, at the constitutional level. Other countries, 
such as Ghana, have constitutions that are sufficiently flexible to accommodate change 
through new laws governing the articulation and regulation of property rights. A differ 
ent category of countries has made changes in their basic law directed at other issues, 
which profoundly affect property rights. One such country is Rwanda, which formally 
recognized women as adults in its 1991 constitution through a clause on citizen equali 
ty, for the first time giving them the ability to own property and take out a mortgage in 
their own name.' 
The focus of this article will be property rights in Uganda, a country that underwent 
major constitutional reform and democratization in the 1990s. The first part discusses 
theory regarding property rights and economic development. The second part addresses 
Ugandan property rights with attention to the political and legal changes that have 
occurred there in recent years. In the third part three impediments to property rights 
change-capacity, corruption, and customary law-are identified. The last part returns 
463 
Comparative Politics July 2007 
to the theory and notes the discontinuities between theoretical predictions and the 
implementation of new property rights in Uganda. 
Two arguments will be put forth. First, the Ugandan Constitution and Land Act 
articulated in law the extant theory regarding the importance of private property rights. 
Key components of the Land Act, such as the voluntary titling and registration of cus 
tomary land rights, amount to the formalization fpreviously informal property rights 
to land. Second, the legal changes that enabled the formalization of informal property 
rights in Uganda are necessary to achieve institutional change in landholding practices 
but insufficient on their own due to a number of impediments. These two arguments 
have been discerned through an analysis of the legislation, examination of the institu 
tional structures that support he new privatized rights, interviews ith government offi 
cials, and fieldwork in the capital city of Kampala and in two regions of Uganda, Tororo 
and Mbarara. 
Uganda emerged from civil conflict in the late 1980s, after which a reform of the 
institutions of government began, culminating in the ratification fa new constitution i  
1995. The new constitution was designed to create the framework for a functioning 
democracy, providing for regular elections and basic civil liberties. Responding to both 
political demand and economic necessity, Uganda used its new constitution to recognize 
specific categories of landholding and to call for a new land law. The constitution creat 
ed the legal template for the dual processes of democratization and decentralization. 
These simultaneous endeavors set the context for the development of a new land law. In 
the effort to create a constitution that would meet the needs of the country, Uganda had 
a unique opportunity to address pressing issues regarding land allocation and owner 
ship, problems that had festered under a series of dictatorships. Uganda is similar to 
other African countries, including Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa, that went 
through the third wave of democratization and have attempted, not always successfully, 
to capture democratic transformations in new basic law that can create an institutional 
environment to sustain both democracy and economic development in the long term. 
Definitions and Caveats 
The term "property rights" is used to refer to the rights of control over an object, a piece 
of land, a resource, or an idea within the bounds of the law. Specifically considered here 
are property rights in land. Land tenure patterns are a kind of property rights system or 
institution that is controlled through both law and custom. Institutions refer to the rules 
of the game: the patterns of behavior constructed by law, custom, or tradition and most 
commonly by a combination of these. 
A caveat is in order. Though this article discusses the enforcement of law and the 
creation of new institutional rules regarding property rights, it should not be assumed 
that law enforcement is the only solution to a state's problems. Law enforcement does 
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not lead to the elimination of social ills and the establishment of social equality, nor is 
state law always the optimal solution to a problem.2 Less expensive models for resolv 
ing civil disputes and clarifying property rights may be found in organic institutional 
development or alternative dispute resolution.3 
Creating and Enforcing Property Rights 
Economic studies reveal the accepted wisdom that clearly defined and enforced private 
property rights to land contribute significantly to economic development.4 
Anthropologists and political scientists have also noted the importance of property 
rights to both economic and political development.5 Secure property rights encourage 
people to invest in their resources and protect those investments against expropriation. 
Scholars have argued that economic efficiency requires a clear definition of the rights of 
ownership, contract, and transfer of land.6 Ambiguity in the definition or enforcement of
any of these rights leads to an increase in transaction costs in the exchange and transfer 
of land as well as a residual uncertainty after any land contract. 
Economists have argued that privatization and defense of the property rights of the 
poor worldwide will increase their well-being, giving them access to business and edu 
cational opportunities.7 Articulating private property rights in law will facilitate co 
nomic growth by creating what De Soto calls "meta" property-the paperwork of title 
and mortgage that can free the surplus value of assets and provide the necessary capital 
for economic growth and development. Without this legal framework of property rights 
people can do business effectively only with those that know them or their family.8 It is 
estimated that in Africa more than 50 percent of the periurban population and 90 percent 
of rural areas have informal tenure and therefore highly insecure and often communal 
property rights.9 Wider economic opportunities for the poor are restricted due to the 
absence of contracts and law that would enable individuals to mortgage their private 
property and use the finds for investment. 
There is a substantial body of literature suggesting that security of land title leads 
to greater investment and increased productivity within and outside of Africa.10 One 
suggested benefit of land title is the increased availability of credit. A foundational 
study in Thailand found that credit was readily available where titling of land existed.'1 
The study confirmed the link between private land ownership and productivity. As in 
much of Africa, credit in Thailand was nearly impossible for rural landowners to obtain 
without the complete legal possession of land as collateral. The Thailand study also 
found that nothing short of privatized tenure would achieve the same effect. However, 
two subsequent studies in Africa discovered that credit was not strongly correlated with 
privatized land rights in Niger, Kenya, and Tanzania, because credit was so limited over 
all.12 Providing title to land, in an area where none exists, is an extremely costly endeav 
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or, yet the Thailand study established that the payoffs are greater than the cost. In other 
countries results have been far more equivocal. Klaus Deininger sums up the research. 
The positive effect of title on the supply of credit will not emerge universally. Formal land titling and 
registration... .are more likely to have a strong credit market impact in situations where informal credit 
markets are already operational and a latent demand exists for formal credit that cannot be satisfied 
because of the lack of formal title.13 
Incentive to invest in land is another link between economic efficiency and proper 
ty rights. Investments in land are highly varied. Most African farmers engage in some 
small-scale investment, such as the fertilization fa field with manure from farm ani 
mals. Other investments, such as the planting of fruit rees, digging of ditches to chan 
nel rain through fields, and the refurbishment of farm buildings or fences, occur 
regularly with minimal capital outlay. Without secure property rights, farmers will be 
unlikely to invest in major improvements on their land, such as buildings or irrigation 
systems. Absent security in land rights, even smaller investments, such as the fertiliza 
tion of fields, are less likely to occur.14 
Reduced transaction costs are the final economic effect of secure land rights. 
Scholars have argued that economic efficiency requires a clear definition of the rights of 
ownership, contract, and transfer of land.15 Ambiguity in the definition of any of these 
rights leads to an increase in transaction costs and a residual uncertainty after any land 
transfer o  contract. High transaction costs due to uncertainty have two consequences. 
First, the value of any immobile property is reduced by the elevated cost of establishing 
clear ownership of the resource. Second, the high costs of exchange also prevent pro 
ductive users from obtaining more land, thus leading to the inefficient allocation of 
resources. With high transaction costs, potential users will be unable to acquire land 
either through rental or purchase at the point at which they could assure a higher return, 
because the marginal product of the owner's use plus transaction costs exceed the mar 
ginal product of the more efficient user. Thus, high transaction costs can impede the 
efficient allocation of land within a society. 
Implicit in these arguments regarding the importance of property rights is that pri 
vate property rights to land, once established, are enforced or defended. While legisla 
tures and judges around the world can create the laws and regulations that protect 
individual property rights, they do not have the responsibility of enforcing them. 
Enforcement is left to the courts and to the local administrative structures or police 
forces across the country. 
In North America, Europe, and other areas with strong states and sufficient fund 
ing, legislative decisions lead to enforcement in a predictable fashion. In these places 
local administrations are comparatively efficient, legal dicta are clearly communicated, 
and local authorities are accountable for implementation. Gary Libecap has noted: 
"With title, the police power of the state can enforce private property rights to land. The 
courts can issue eviction notices against trespassers or arbitrate boundary disputes, and 
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law enforcement officials can implement court orders."16 This statement reflects the 
assumption made by many scholars that legislative decisions will be enforced through 
out a country by states that have effective control over the entirety of their territory. 
While this assumption may be true in North America, Australia, and Europe, it is not so 
in much of the world. Not only are the assumptions of enforcement false, they lead to 
seriously misplaced policy initiatives that focus on lawmaking, while neglecting the 
problems of law enforcement or implementation. In the absence of a strong local admin 
istrative structure, enforcement of laws regarding property is far less certain. 
Development of new property law is a necessary but insufficient condition for institu 
tional change in property rights. 
According to the reasoning of the property rights chool, the best thing for those 
countries seeking to increase their economic growth rates and fully benefit from the 
globalized economy would be to make every effort o define private property rights 
clearly and establish the institutions for the creation of meta property, such as effective 
mortgage arrangements and accessible titling of customary or informally held lands. 
However, Douglass North argues that changing the formal rules of a society, such as the 
definition of property rights, is an incremental process that is constrained by the past. 
Vested interests in previous institutions see change as a threat to their survival and limit 
the development of new rules.17 Theory thus demands a reconstruction f the rules of 
the game, while at the same time urging caution when discussing any grand changes 
designed to alter institutions radically. Critical to this theoretical disconnect is the prob 
lem of time. Organic property rights change occurs over time marked in decades rather 
than years.'8 Governments may change law quickly, but implementation f the legal 
changes is a much longer process in underresourced states. 
Added to these issues is the challenge of institutional capacity. Given the lack of 
resources of governments across the developing world, property rights changes are dif 
ficult to achieve even when supported by the executive, bureaucracy, and other neces 
sary organizations. The effectiveness of municipal administrations in rural areas far 
from the center of power has been questioned in relation to the state, development, and 
public administration in Africa.19 Given the dubious capacity of local governance across 
much of Africa, it is revealing to examine where and for whom laws are enforced and to 
what degree local administrative structures influence the implementation of changes in 
property rights. 
Land Tenure in Uganda 
There were several significant problems with Uganda's land tenure system that created 
a poor environment for economic growth and agricultural development. Prior to the col 
onization of Uganda the Baganda kingdom controlled much of the territory of central 
Uganda.20 The British defeated the kingdom in 1894 and occupied the entirety of what 
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is now Uganda. However, given the British colonial policy of indirect rule, whereby the 
administration f colonies was conducted through indigenous leaders, the British sought 
the support of the Bagandan king (the Kabaka) and Bagandan elites. This support was 
arranged through the 1900 Buganda agreement, which allocated land to indigenous 
notables and relegated those farming the land to secured tenancy. This system, referred 
to as mailo, required peasant farmers to pay yearly rents to absentee landlords. Yet the 
compliance of tenants was not always assured, and trouble with the system began during 
the colonial era. After independence, the issue of the status of tenants on mailo land was 
raised again.2' 
In 1975, in an effort o deal with these problems, Idi Amin implemented the Land 
Reform Decree, which declared all the land in Uganda to be public property under the 
control of district land boards and ultimately the central government. The 1975 Land 
Reform Decree turned the mailo land certificates into fixed-term leases from the central 
government. While this change provided further security to tenants on mailo land, the 
landlords were unhappy with it. It was one of several issues from the colonial era and the 
years of dictatorship that led to confusion over property rights that had to be addressed 
in any new land law. However, civil conflict precluded any major change in property 
rights until the 1990s. 
After Yoweri Museveni took power in 1986, stability returned to most of Uganda, 
and the political space opened for a revision of property rights. Priorities for addressing 
problems of land tenure in Uganda were formulated by researchers carrying out field 
surveys to determine the necessary changes in Uganda's landholding system. These 
studies resulted in several goals for land reform in Uganda. First, the land reform sys 
tem should contribute to the economic development of agriculture and of the nation. 
Second, the land tenure system should be flexible in the transfer of land so that farmers 
most capable of using the land profitably would be able to obtain it. Third, the land 
tenure system should protect access to land for people who have no income-earning pos 
sibilities outside the agricultural sector. Fourth, land tenure law should facilitate the evo 
lution of land tenure toward a single, uniform, and efficient system for the whole 
nation.22 These important s udies established the groundwork for constitutional reforms 
to landholding. 
The 1995 Constitution 
The constitution diverged from the 1975 Land Reform Decree, which had vested all 
landholding rights in the government of Uganda, by declaring that all land belonged to 
the citizens of Uganda. In Chapter 15 of the Ugandan constitution, four different cate 
gories of land tenure were established: customary tenure, leasehold, freehold, and mailo 
land. 
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The constitution called for the creation of a new law that would recognize the rights 
of bona fide occupants of mailo land with security of tenure. This change furthered the 
uncertainty regarding mailo land. To whom did the land belong? What were the specif 
ic rights of the tenants? What were the rights, if any, of the landlords? The constitution 
also raised uncertainties regarding the property rights of those holding their lands on a 
customary basis. Farmers with customary landholding were guaranteed security of 
tenure by Article 237 (4): "a) all Uganda citizens owning land under customary tenure 
may acquire certificates of ownership in a manner prescribed by Parliament; and b) land 
under customary tenure may be converted to freehold land ownership by registration." 
While the provision of the right of registration and freehold to those owning land 
through customary land tenure systems was wholly in keeping with extant theories of 
property, the mechanisms for registering and converting land were not in place, nor were 
they articulated in the constitution. Moreover, laws and regulations regarding the 
exchange of land and the length of leases, particularly for foreigners, foreign-owned 
businesses, and corporations, were also unclear.23 These uncertainties nsured that the 
creation of a new land law was dictated not just by constitutional decree, but also by 
grass-roots demand for security of tenure and the economic imperative of a country 
seeking rapid growth. 
One final aspect of the 1995 constitution would become important in the articula 
tion and implementation of the Land Act of 1998: the issue of harmful traditional prac 
tices, particularly as they applied to women. In Article 26 of the constitution, every 
citizen of Uganda is given the right o own property. Article 33 specifically addresses 
the rights of women, according them "full and equal dignity of the person" with men 
and prohibiting "laws, cultures, customs or traditions which are against the dignity, wel 
fare or interest of women or which undermine their status."24 These constitutional guar 
antees were taken quite seriously by Uganda's female parliamentarians and leaders.25 
They were the first expression of equality under the law and recognition that there were 
existing practices that were harmful to women. Due to extensive and well-publicized 
constitutional discussions, many Ugandan citizens, particularly women, were made 
aware of their constitutional rights. Additionally, women were well-represented in the 
drafting of the constitution. Women lawyers erved on the constitutional commission; 
women's organizations submitted opinions; and 18 percent of members of the constitu 
tional assembly were women.26 The result of all this participation was a constitution that 
was extremely progressive with regard to women's rights and an educated constituency 
of women's activists. 
The Land Act of 1998 
After the constitution created a parliamentary mandate for a new land law, the specifics 
of that law were met with great public interest. The parliamentary debate on the Land 
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Act was vigorous, inciting such great controversy that at one point the government 
feared civil unrest.27 
The Land Act of 1998 brought about a transformation of the titling, dispute resolu 
tion systems, and basic land law for Uganda. The law created a mechanism for custom 
ary land to be formally recognized and then titled. It captured contemporary economic 
thought regarding private property rights, insofar as there was a clear focus on creating 
security and titled freehold where it had not existed previously. There was also provision 
for the creation of formalized customary tenure and the eventual transition of customary 
tenure to titled freehold. In addition to the potential for the titling of customary land, the 
Land Act also sought to increase tenure security by providing legal rights of occupancy 
to squatters. The Land Act recognized as a "bona fide occupant" anyone who "had occu 
pied and utilized or developed any land unchallenged by the registered owner or agent 
of the registered owner for twelve years or more." This provision had the effect of giv 
ing security of tenure even to those resident on land that was not their own.28 
In the Land Act women were awarded the right to challenge their husbands if they 
attempted to sell the land on which the wives resided, through what is referred to as "the 
consent clause." However, an amendment to the act, which would have given women the 
right to co-ownership of family land, was eliminated from the final version under dubi 
ous circumstances. The government promised that the issue of co-ownership would be 
raised again in the Domestic Relations Bill, but this premise has yet to be fulfilled and 
its fulfillment does not appear likely in the future.29 Instead, some of the protections of 
third party rights (those of dependent children) to land that were present in the 1998 
Land Act were retracted when it was amended in 2004.30 
The 1998 Land Act clearly embraced the individualized property model. In so 
doing, it allowed for the creation of meta property that can be mortgaged and trans 
ferred, bequeathed, and exchanged.3' The provisions of the Land Act correspond with 
the theory of property rights in that the mechanisms to facilitate exchange, rental, mort 
gage and dispute resolution in relation to land are clearly articulated and applied to all 
of the major forms of landholding in Uganda. Moreover, the voluntary nature of the reg 
istration and titling process for customary land demonstrated an awareness of the failure 
of mandatory titling in neighboring states, such as Kenya, and the differences in demand 
for land and for title across regions of Uganda.32 The titling mechanisms in the Land Act 
have the potential to, over time and in a voluntary manner, draw all land in Uganda into 
the formal, titled sphere. 
Implementing the Land Act 
Making a law and getting it passed by a legislature are only the beginning of the process 
of institutional change. Implementing and enforcing the changes that are required under 
a newly written law are a difficult and lengthy process, particularly in countries where 
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resources at the local level are not sufficient for the tasks of administration. In the 
United States, as in many other developed countries, once the legislature passes a law, 
the appropriate implementation and enforcement bodies are informed and are capable of 
taking action immediately. For example, if the U.S. Supreme Court decides to change 
the criteria for lawful searches by police officers, once the decision is made public, the 
police patrolling the streets are informed through a variety of processes. They will like 
ly be made aware of the law through their local state's attorney, district attorney, orcoun 
ty attorney. Regional law officers' associations send out daily bulletins by email 
updating chiefs of police on legal decisions that might affect hem. Websites and publi 
cations targeted at the officers on the street hat discuss legal changes and their affect on 
police behavior provide additional information a d education for officers. Thus, there 
are well-developed mechanisms both to pass information along to the people who most 
need it and to ensure that they are held accountable for knowing about legal changes. In 
many developed countries, then, the making of a new law is a sufficient condition for 
institutional change. It is not enough throughout much of the world where the organiza 
tional capacity and the resources necessary to convey facts about alterations in law and 
necessary changes in police or judicial behavior rapidly and accurately are absent. The 
enforcement of the Land Act illuminates the difficulties in changing property rights 
institutions through law in an attempt o achieve greater economic growth in challeng 
ing settings where the resources of the state are limited. 
In order to assess the implementation and impact of the Land Act, paired case stud 
ies were conducted in Tororo and Mbarara in Uganda in 2005 and 2006. These two areas 
represent very different regions of the country. Tororo is in the far western part of 
Uganda in an area populated by the Japadhola and Teso with a mix of ethnic groups in 
the urban areas. Tororo district has a population density of 329 people per square kilo 
meter, with some commercial farming projects as well as subsistence farming and the 
Tororo Cement Factory.33 Tororo is politically insignificant and poor. Land in the area is 
held through customary, communal tenure in the countryside. In the towns land is leased 
on a long and short term basis and can be purchased as freehold. It is possible to lease 
customary land in the rural areas. 
Mbarara is located within the pastoralist corridor that runs from the northwest cor 
ner of Uganda through to the southwest. The people around Mbarara are Banyankole 
with a greater mix of ethnic groups in the towns. Land in the area around Mbarara has 
traditionally been held through customary tenure on an individual basis. In the country 
side people practice subsistence agriculture and some pastoralism. Population density in 
Mbarara district is 112 people per square kilometer.34 Because President Yoweri 
Museveni hails from Mbarara, it is often noted as particularly well-resourced in terms of 
local administration and governance. Tororo and Mbarara were chosen as study sites to 
examine areas of the country with very different administrative capabilities. In each 
region, structured interviews ere conducted with officials working in the local land tri 
bunals, land board offices, local nongovernmental organizations, and the police to 
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determine the degree to which the Land Act had been implemented, the nature of dis 
putes in the area, and the problems of implementation. Interviews with people pursuing 
land disputes were conducted in both areas. In Tororo a local nongovernmental organi 
zation facilitated a focus group with women to discuss the consent clause. Officials 
from the Ministry of Lands, Water, and the Environment were interviewed in Kampala, 
as were representatives from women's organizations and nongovernmental organiza 
tions concerned with the Land Act and its implementation. Approximately thirty inter 
views and one focus group were conducted overall. Statistics were gathered from the 
land tribunals regarding the nature of cases heard, the time for a case to move from com 
plaint to resolution, and the number of complaints filed. 
Tracking Institutional Change 
From the time the Land Act was written, it was clear that there would be difficulties with 
implementation.35 As the bill was being debated, interested factions in the government 
bureaucracy, particularly the Directorate of Lands and Environment, a subunit of the 
Ministry of Water, Lands, and Environment, took up positions to weaken the reforms 
made and maintain the centrality of their organization. Patrick McAuslan, who partici 
pated in writing the Land Act, recounted the specifics of this obstructionist behavior. 
The Directorate of Lands and Environment delayed instituting the recommendations for 
implementing the Land Act and fought its own marginalization.36 It previously had con 
trolled funds that under the Land Act are allocated to the districts in order to finance the 
activities of the district land boards. When the directorate ceased to control the money 
allocated to the administration of land, it declined in importance. Therefore, it tried to 
redirect revenue to the institutions created by the Land Act that were under its control, 
such as the land fund, which was intended to provide compensation to those that lost 
their land to state appropriation.37 
This bureaucratic obstructionism is precisely the kind of impediment to institution 
al change that North identified. North noted that "dominant organizations (and their 
entrepreneurs) may view the necessary changes as a threat to their survival. To the 
degree that the entrepreneurs of such organizations control decision making they can 
thwart he necessary changes."38 However, there were additional problems of imple 
mentation that quickly became evident. Many of these can be captured under the rubric 
of a lack of capacity. 
With all of the new institutions and tribunals created for the administration of land 
in Uganda, it was estimated that an extra 20,000 trained administrative personnel would 
be needed to staff the different bodies created by the bill.39 The difficulty in finding 
trained personnel was perhaps even more acute in Uganda than in other countries due to 
the effects of AIDS deaths on the working-age population. Tied to the issue of capacity 
was that of funding. Creating the new land offices and land tribunals required addition 
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al monetary resources, but the Land Act made no specific provisions for this funding. 
Despite the fact that the Land Act was passed in 1998, by 2000 there were no function 
ing tribunals, and several people were killed in increasing violence over land disputes, 
perhaps as a result of the absence of government dispute settlement mechanisms.40 In 
Tororo the land board was established and staffed only in 2006. In Mbarara the land tri 
bunal was established much earlier in 2001, but it did not hear cases until 2003 due to 
logistical problems in getting desks, furniture, and files. 
Though the land tribunals are now in place throughout the country, there are still 
problems with dispensing salary payments to them. In some district land tribunals, 
money for salaries and expenses can be up to two months late, forcing the tribunals to 
cease hearing cases.41 Lapses and delays in the implementation of any major change are 
to be expected. What is important to note in this case is that eight years after the Land 
Act was passed by the legislature the problems of capacity persist. In Mbarara the dis 
trict land tribunal meets once a month, in Tororo less often due to a lack of resources. 
Even in the capital city of Kampala the district land tribunal meets only two days a 
month, regardless of the number of complaints filed.42 
Corruption also contributes to the difficulties in implementing major institutional 
change. In Uganda the government bureaucracy is infamous for its corruption and the 
additional "fees" that are necessary to obtain proper documentation of land ownership 
or land transfer, unless one is willing to wait years for access to a certificate of title.43 
There are multiple instances of citizen complaints regarding delays of up to five years in 
the titling of land or requests for bribes from bureaucrats responsible for filing the title. 
There are scandalous examples of land theft and allocation of multiple titles to the same 
plot. In one high profile case, the Kampala city council was accused of obtaining title to 
land on which public schools were built, then selling that land. This particular case led 
to a public statement by the minister of local government that anyone dealing with the 
Kampala city council does so "at his or her own risk."44 These problems are more per 
vasive in areas where the demand for land is greater, such as highly populated or urban 
areas. While this sort of corruption exists in such an important government ministry, the 
economic benefits anticipated from the new Land Act are unlikely to materialize. Such 
egregious examples of corruption were not present in either Tororo or Mbarara, where 
land values were lower, although people in both areas complained of long delays in 
receiving titles from the central government, unless one was willing to pay a bribe. 
Customary law, the uncodified traditions and practices of different e hnic groups, 
still governs the allocation and inheritance of customary land in much of the country 
outside the capital city. In Mbarara land is held on a customary basis in individualized 
plots, so the movement towards individualized private tenure is not as sharp a disjunc 
ture as it is in Tororo and other areas of the country where customary land is commu 
nally held by a lineage. In both areas the Land Act has been most controversial in its 
efforts to recognize the property rights of women. Customary law challenges the letter 
and the intent of both the constitution and the Land Act, as it interferes with the formal 
473 
Comparative Politics July 2007 
recognition of the property rights of women. Under customary law, men own or control 
land. Women may farm the land, but they are allowed access to it only through their rela 
tionships with men.45 
Martin Chanock and others have noted that older men, empowered by the coloniza 
tion process, formed customary law during the colonial era.46 The creation of customary 
law excluded women's voices and women's property rights. This issue is economically 
significant across most of the African continent where women are engaged in both pro 
duction and reproduction.47 Indeed, African women are farmers, and it is their responsi 
bility to feed their families. Their access to land and other forms of property is therefore 
extremely important for economic development. Formalization of customary law in the 
name of its owner is done in the name of the household head, who is male. This process 
limits women's use rights to the land that are present under customary law. To the extent 
that customary law excludes women from ownership of land and other forms of proper 
ty, it also impedes their access to capital. 
According to custom, females marry into the clans of their husband. In rural communities, the clan will 
allocate customary land to the man upon his marriage. The matrimonial home is usually built on cus 
tomary land and is regarded as the husband's property until he dies, at which time ownership reverts to 
the clan. Because customary rules systematically exclude females from the clan or communal entity, 
they also exclude females from ownership of land. Moreover, since women are seen as belonging to 
neither their families nor marital clans, they are denied by both sources the opportunity to own land. As 
a result, they are alienated from land ownership from childhood to widowhood.48 
The constitution gives women equal access to land with men and forbids discrimi 
nation. Article 33.4 of the constitution says: "Women shall have the right to equal treat 
ment with men and that right shall include equal opportunities in political, economic 
and social activities." Not surprisingly, in practice women do not enjoy equality. 
Under the constitution women are granted rights to land that they did not have 
under customary law. Women now have the right to act on their own behalf in purchas 
ing, transferring, and bequeathing land as they wish and in representing themselves and 
their property interests in court. However, few women are able to take advantage of 
these new property rights. Given the nature of marital economic relationships described 
above, specifically the belief that all marital property belongs to the husband, few 
women have the resources to purchase land in their own name.49 
The dilemma for women comes through the recognition of customary land tenure 
in the constitution and the Land Act without the implementation of joint ownership of 
marital property (the clause that did not make it into the final document). Under cus 
tomary land tenure arrangements, no woman has the right to ownership of customary 
land either through inheritance or through joint ownership of marital property. By rec 
ognizing customary tenure, without providing for co-ownership of marital property, the 
Land Act violates women's constitutional rights to equality. 
Article 27 of the Constitution protects the right of women, but it is very difficult for rural women to 
invoke the constitution in terms of her right to inherit land. In effect they are saying that women can 
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continue to inherit land under customary law. Which means they won't inherit, and so its taking us back 
to where we started.50 
However, the Land Act does protect women's right o live on and farm "family land," 
whether it is customary or freehold. The marital consent clause prevents one spouse 
from selling the "land on which is situated the ordinary residence of the family and from 
which the family derive sustenance" without the approval of the other.51 
The controversy surrounding the marital consent clause gives an indication of the 
sensitivity ofwomen's property rights issues.52 Women face difficulty in blocking their 
husbands' sale of residential property if they are not aware of their rights or are not 
legally married. Many women have customary marriages; for these to be recognized by 
law, the bride price must be fully paid.53 Evidence from a 2006 survey of 2,227 house 
holds in twenty districts of Uganda that was conducted by Associates for Development 
and the Centre for Basic Research shows that consent is being sought by spouses in most 
areas of the country. The percentage of respondents who sold land and did not obtain 
spousal consent was 26 percent in the North, 14 percent in the East, the area of the coun 
try in which Tororo can be found, 8 percent in the Central area where Mbarara is locat 
ed, and 10 percent in the West.54 
Because of the demand for legislation protecting women's property rights, coupled 
with the educational efforts of women's organizations, the consent clause has been 
implemented more quickly than other institutional innovations. Yet recognition of cus 
tomary land tenure in the constitution and the Land Act is still at odds with constitu 
tional guarantees of gender equality. When it comes to the ownership and control of 
property, customary law and equality of citizenship are incompatible. Because of the 
public nature of constitutional discussions, women are increasingly aware of their ights. 
Consequently, some women have lodged cases over land with the local land tribunals 
based on the constitution. In Mbarara District, there are instances of women who have 
been married for forty years or more going to the land tribunals and trying, unsuccess 
fully, to gain a piece of the land of their natal family based on their constitutional rights 
of equality.55 Bikaako and Ssenkumba rgue that most women's efforts to achieve con 
trol of land through the courts in Uganda are frustrated.56 Yet the choice of these women 
to go to court to pursue these issues suggests that they are aware of their constitutional 
rights and unafraid of engaging bureaucratic processes to try to achieve them. 
Conclusion: Linking Theory and Practice 
Hernando De Soto recognized that there might be difficulties in implementing ew 
property rights for the poor. He indicated that the problem would lie with the lawyers 
who would try to block any reform in order to protect the status quo from "extralegal 
behavior or large scale change."57 Lawyers who are resistant to economic reforms may 
475 
Comparative Politics July 2007 
be problematic in other contexts; in Uganda the barriers to change have been entirely 
different. 
Controversy over the Land Act arose because some thought it had gone too far in 
changing land rights and others that it had not gone far enough. These arguments 
focused on women's land rights, rather than privatization, and the repeated calls for fur 
ther reform are indicative of demands that go radically beyond what has already been 
enacted. Although the Land Act provides the legal basis for the award of titles and the 
adjudication of disputes, the bureaucracies that should facilitate these changes have only 
slowly been established and have often operated without appropriate staffing or funding. 
Corruption has undermined the effectiveness of the new titling mechanisms articulated 
in the law. This has slowed the process of titling customary landholding as well as the 
transfer or titling of freehold, so much so that according to the Uganda Land Alliance 
eight years after the implementation of the Land Act not one plot of customary land was 
titled.58 This slowness in implementation is what economic theory would predict is like 
ly to occur when radical shifts in land rights are legislated from the center. North has 
argued that, "institutional change is incremental, gradual and constrained by the histor 
ical past."59 The Land Act and the constitution were necessary but not sufficient condi 
tions for institutional change. 
One aspect of the past that interferes with the new articulation of rights in Uganda 
is customary law, specifically as it relates to women and what they can and can not own. 
"Property can not own property" is an oft-repeated aphorism in Uganda describing why 
women can not own their own land.60 It also sheds light on cultural practices at odds 
with women's constitutional rights. Customary law in Uganda defines the past institu 
tional structures relating to land allocation in Uganda, and it recognizes women as labor 
or property.61 
The recent changes in the property law of Uganda have been an effort to achieve the 
gains from private individualized tenure. The injunction articulated by De Soto and oth 
ers to recognize and privatize formally the property rights that already exist informally 
must be weighed carefully against the understanding that allocation of property rights to 
male heads of household without a legal framework for the joint ownership of property 
may be exclusionary in ways damaging to economic growth and contrary to concepts of 
justice. Nevertheless, it is particularly interesting that the one aspect of the Land Act that 
specifically tries to protect women's use rights to property, the spousal consent clause, 
has been implemented across the country, as a result of strong demand from below cou 
pled with an array of civil society organizations that carefully monitored its implemen 
tation. 
The Land Act has not yet been fully implemented and enforced in Uganda. It has 
not yet been an effective instrument in the formalization of property rights. The neces 
sity of law in changing property rights can not be disregarded, but it is not the end goal 
in developing countries that it might be in the industrialized world. It is a beginning. 
Injecting a realistic representation of both time and process into discussions of institu 
476 
Sandra F Joireman 
tional change is imperative in grasping amore complete understanding ofhow change 
occurs and when it is likely to be impeded. In light of what economists ay regarding the 
timing and the difficulty of changing property rights, the failure of law to be an effec 
tive tool of economic transformation seems to be a matter of excessively optimistic 
expectations. 
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